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‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’
 
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\subsection{slide-5}
We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress), so we would expect ...
 
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\subsection{slide-6}
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that without the intevention
 
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\subsection{slide-7}
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will matter less?
 
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\subsection{slide-8}
what we are seeing is that the influence of preferences wanes, indicating that habitual processes
 
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\subsection{slide-11}
‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’
 
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\subsection{slide-14}
‘Figure 1. (A) Time line of the experiment. Participants were first trained in the instrumental task. After the selective outcome devaluation (satiation with oranges or chocolate pudding) but before the extinction test, subjects were exposed to stress (socially evaluated cold pressor test) or a control condition. (B) The instrumental task (reproduced with permission from the Society for Neuroscience). Participants completed three trial types (chocolate, orange, and neutral). In each trial type, there was one action that led with a high probability to a food outcome and one action that led with a low probability to a food outcome. Depending on the trial type, the high probability action yielded chocolate milk or orange juice with a probability of p = 0.5, a common outcome (peppermint tea) with a probability of p = 0.2, or nothing. The low probability action led to the common liquid with a probability of p = 0.2. After an action was chosen, the referring symbol was highlighted for 3 s before the food was delivered. During the extinction test, chocolate milk and orange juice were no longer presented.’
 
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\subsection{slide-16}
‘Figure 6. Percent high probability actions of controls and stressed participants in the last 15-trial block of training and the first 15-trial block of extinction testing. After selective outcome devaluation, controls showed a decrease in the choice of the high probability action associated with the food eaten to satiety (* p < .01) whereas the choice behavior of stressed participants was insensitive to the changes in outcome value. Data represent M ± SEM.’
 
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\subsection{slide-19}
We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress), so we would expect ...
 
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\subsection{slide-20}
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that without the intevention
 
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\subsection{slide-21}
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will matter less?
 
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\subsection{slide-24}
This is from a different study than the one I will emphasise: in this study they only demonstrate instrumental behaviour in young children.
 
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\subsection{slide-25}
Even young children can perform instrumental actions, but perhaps not very young children.
 
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\subsection{slide-28}
If we intervene on preferences, we should hardly influence habitual processes but should strongly influence goal-directed processes. The fact that the intervention on preferences modulates a certain instrumental action therefore indicates that the goal-directed processes are influencing that instrumental action.
 
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\subsection{slide-30}
Another way of looking at it ...
 
what we are seeing is that the influence of preferences wanes, indicating that habitual processes
 
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\subsection{slide-35}
‘Once responding at a high and constant rate in the single-action condition after extended training, agents no longer experience [...] episodes in which they do not respond and do not receive the outcome. As a result, the action-outcome causal representation necessary for goal-directed action is not maintained.’
 
(Dickinson, 2016, p. 181)
 
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\subsection{slide-40}

Training Effects (Klossek, Yu \& Dickinson, 2011)

Source: (Dickinson, 2016, p. 180) Which is about Klossek, U. M. H., Yu, S., \& Dickinson, A. (2011). Choice and goal-directed behavior in preschool children. Learning and Behavior, 39, 350-357.

Subjects: 3-4 year olds

Training:

Choice Group : perform Action1 to see Clip1 or Action2 to see Clip2

Single-Action Group : only one action is available at once

(But both actions are trained, just sequentially)

(Frequency of Action1 and Action2 is matched across groups!)

Devalue Clip1 (expose to satiety)

Test: both actions available. What do Ss select?

test is done in EXTINCTION

Results:

Choice group selects Action2

Single-Action Group selects Action1 and Action2 equally

As predicted if Instrumental
As predicted if Habitual
‘We argued that the variation in the development of behavioral autonomy arose from the different contingency experienced of the two groups. Once responding at a high and constant rate in the single-action condition after extended training, agents no longer experience the full causal contingency, speci cally episodes in which they do not respond and do not receive the outcome. As a result, the action-outcome causal representation necessary for goal-directed action is not maintained.’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 181)
 
Source: (Dickinson, 2016, p. 180) Which is about Klossek, U. M. H., Yu, S., \& Dickinson, A. (2011). Choice and goal-directed behavior in preschool children. Learning and Behavior, 39, 350-357.
 
(But both actions are trained, just sequentially)
 
test is done in EXTINCTION
 
As predicted if Instrumental
 
As predicted if Habitual
 
‘We argued that the variation in the development of behavioral autonomy arose from the different contingency experienced of the two groups. Once responding at a high and constant rate in the single-action condition after extended training, agents no longer experience the full causal contingency, speci cally episodes in which they do not respond and do not receive the outcome. As a result, the action-outcome causal representation necessary for goal-directed action is not maintained.’ (Dickinson, 2016, p. 181)
 
‘Mean response rates per second during training for the choice and single-action groups. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means’
 
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\subsection{slide-41}
‘Mean percentage response rates for the choice and single- action groups during the postdevaluation extinction test. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means’
 
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\subsection{slide-43}
Only the dual-process theory can predict that devaluation will have less effect in the one- than in the two-action condition
 
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\subsection{slide-44}
‘Once responding at a high and constant rate in the single-action condition after extended training, agents no longer experience [...] episodes in which they do not respond and do not receive the outcome. As a result, the action-outcome causal representation necessary for goal-directed action is not maintained.’
 
(Dickinson, 2016, p. 181)
 
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\subsection{slide-46}
‘[instumental] and habitual control have been doubly dissociated in two brain regions.
 
In the PFC, lesions of the prelimbic and infralimbic areas disrupt goal-directed and habitual behavior, respectively ...
 
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\subsection{slide-47}
These dissociations suggest that different neural circuits mediate the two forms of control’
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\subsection{slide-48}
(Dickinson, 2016, p. 184)
 
‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’
 
‘instrumental behavior itself involves two systems, the goal-directed and the habitual’
 
‘[instumental] and habitual control have been doubly dissociated in two brain regions.
 
In the PFC, lesions of the prelimbic and infralimbic areas disrupt goal-directed and habitual behavior, respectively ...
 
These dissociations suggest that different neural circuits mediate the two forms of control’
(Dickinson, 2016, p. 184)
 

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