Goal-Directed and Habitual: Some Evidence
We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress),
so we would expect ...
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that
without the intevention
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will
matter less?
Schwabe and Wolf, 2010 figure 1
‘Figure 1. (A) Time line of the experiment. Participants were first trained in the instrumental task. After the selective outcome devaluation (satiation with oranges or chocolate pudding) but before the extinction test, subjects were exposed to stress (socially evaluated cold pressor test) or a control condition. (B) The instrumental task (reproduced with permission from the Society for Neuroscience). Participants completed three trial types (chocolate, orange, and neutral). In each trial type, there was one action that led with a high probability to a food outcome and one action that led with a low probability to a food outcome. Depending on the trial type, the high probability action yielded chocolate milk or orange juice with a probability of p = 0.5, a common outcome (peppermint tea) with a probability of p = 0.2, or nothing. The low probability action led to the common liquid with a probability of p = 0.2. After an action was chosen, the referring symbol was highlighted for 3 s before the food was delivered. During the extinction test, chocolate milk and orange juice were no longer presented.’
Schwabe and Wolf, 2010 figure 6
‘Figure 6. Percent high probability actions of controls and stressed participants in the last 15-trial block of training and the first 15-trial block of extinction testing. After selective outcome devaluation, controls showed a decrease in the choice of the high probability action associated with the food eaten to satiety (* p < .01) whereas the choice behavior of stressed participants was insensitive to the changes in outcome value. Data represent M ± SEM.’
We are intervening on the cognitive load (stress),
so we would expect ...
Lower influence from goal-directed processes that
without the intevention
But how does this lead to the prediction that preferences will
matter less?
Klossek & Dickinson, 2012 figure 1a
This is from a different study than the one I will emphasise:
in this study they only demonstrate instrumental behaviour in young children.
Klossek & Dickinson, 2012 figure 2
Even young children can perform instrumental actions, but perhaps not very young children.
If we intervene on preferences, we should hardly influence habitual processes
but should strongly influence goal-directed processes.
The fact that the intervention on preferences modulates a certain instrumental action
therefore indicates that the goal-directed processes are influencing
that instrumental action.
Training Effects (Klossek, Yu & Dickinson, 2011)
Source: (Dickinson, 2016, p. 180)
Which is about Klossek, U. M. H., Yu, S., & Dickinson, A. (2011). Choice and goal-directed behavior in preschool children. Learning and Behavior, 39, 350-357.
test is done in EXTINCTION
Klossek et al, 2011 figure 1
‘Mean response rates per second during training for the choice and single-action groups. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means’
Klossek et al, 2011 figure 2
‘Mean percentage response rates for the choice and single- action groups during the postdevaluation extinction test. Error bars represent the standard errors of the means’