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Ethics: Significance of Two Systems

 

Ethics: Significance of Two Systems

s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk & c.sinigaglia

not-justified-inferentially premises

moral intuition

‘Intuition is a resource in all of philosophy, but perhaps nowhere more than in ethics’

(Audi, 2015, p. 57).

‘Episodic intuitions [...] can serve as data [...] beliefs that derive from them receive prima facie justification’ (p. 65).

Always gotta ask what it means. Audi explains it in terms of self-evidence (if you understand it you know it).
me:

not-justified-inferentially premises:

an illustration

‘Chidi is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. [...] Chidi can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 206).

May Chidi turn the trolley?

Why may Chidi but not Eleanor?

Foot (1967): because duties not to harm rank above duties to help

Why may Frank but not Eleanor?

Thomson’s argument

If Foot, then Frank may not.

But Frank may.

I’m simplifying: Thomson gives this further scrutiny later in the paper (the school-boy playing on the tracks ...).

Therefore: not Foot.

‘Eleanor can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his [five] patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his [five] patients die’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 206).

May Eleanor kill the healthy person?

‘Frank is a passenger on a trolley whose driver has just shouted that the trolley's brakes have failed, and who then died of the shock. [...] Frank can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, letting the five die’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 207).

May Frank turn the trolley?

Chidi is avoiding harming five people. But Eleanor is helping five people at the cost of harming one.

Thomson’s proposal

‘what matters [...] is whether the agent distributes it by doing something to it, or whether he distributes it by doing something to a person’

(Thomson, 1976, p. 216).

‘Frank is a passenger on a trolley whose driver has just shouted that the trolley's brakes have failed, and who then died of the shock. [...] Frank can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, letting the five die’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 207).

May Frank turn the trolley?

‘Eleanor can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his [five] patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his [five] patients die’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 206).

May Eleanor kill the healthy person?

so far:

Some ethical arguments are driven by intuition.

Greene’s Argument

a loose reconstruction, avoiding premises about which factors are morally relevant.

1. Fast processes influence which intutions you have.

2. Fast processes are limited.

Therefore:

3. Where an ethical argument for a conclusion over which humans divide relies on intuitions as premises, we cannot use the argument to gain knowledge of its conclusion.

Why was it that people untrained in physics so often predicted a spiral, even though they could not have seen such a thing (because it’s physically impossible)?

McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green (1980, p. figure 2D)

why?

because fast processes make it appear so
(Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001)

Does the fast process directly influence the slow judgement?

No. (Or not significantly.)

fast process -> appearance + high subjective confidence

reflection on appearance -> slow judgement

The fast process provides phenomenal material for slow judgement.

Fast processes influence physical intuitions. Can we infer that they also influence moral intuitions?

(What other factors might influence moral intuitions?)

What else shapes intuitions other than fast processes?

1. Fast processes influence which intutions you have.

2. Fast processes are limited.

Therefore:

3. Where an ethical argument for a conclusion over which humans divide relies on intuitions as premises, we cannot use the argument to gain knowledge of its conclusion.

Can we expect to find limits?

Fast processes are flexible and trainable. (No mention of limits.)

Railton (2014)

In other domains, fast processes show signature limits even in expert adults

- Objects (Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001)

- Minds (Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2016)

- Number (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004)

This is not an accident: any broadly inferential process must make a trade-off between speed and accuracy.

wicked learning environments

‘When a person’s past experience is both representative of the situation relevant to the decision and supported by much , trust the intuition; when it is not, be careful’

(Hogarth, 2010, p. 343).

This is based on situations where statistical inference is possible.

action at a distance

weapons of mass destruction (Thomson, 1976)

...

Contrast chess.
Even on the boldest, most optimistic view, there will be moral scenarios bizarre enough that the answers would be no.
Further, insofar as philosophers use moral scenarios to explore edge cases and fine contrasts, they increase the risks of outrunning ‘representative experience’ and ‘valid feedback’.
[It’s the opposite of what cartoon designers are doing (they are exploiting conditions under which fast processes can be tricked).]

1. Fast processes influence which intutions you have.

2. Fast processes are limited.

Therefore:

3. Where an ethical argument for a conclusion over which humans divide relies on intuitions as premises, we cannot use the argument to gain knowledge of its conclusion.

application: reflective equilibrium

One standard in ethics: Rawls’ reflective equilibrium idea
‘one may think of moral theory at first [...] as the attempt to describe our moral capacity [...] what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 41); see Singer (1974) for critical discussion.

‘one may think of physical moral theory at first [...]
as the attempt to describe our moralperceptual capacity

Interesting: seems like Rawls’ project requires the methods of psychology (and is moral psychology)

[...]

what is required is

a formulation of a set of principles which,

when conjoined to our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances,

would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons

were we to apply these principles’

Rawls, 1999 p. 41

The idea of moral theory as an attempt to describe our moral capacity is great. The problem is thinking this can be done by characterising the judgements.
Given multiple moral foundations, or multiple processes, we would not necessarily expect a consistent set of principles. Indeed it is unclear that logical consistency in ethics is particularly valuable.

Dilemma for Rawls’ Reflective Equilibrium

Horn 1 : If you include not-justified-inferentially judgements about, or with implications for, unfamiliar* situations, you are not justified in starting there.

Horn 2 : If you include only not-justified-inferentially judgements about familiar* situations, you are not justified in generalising from them.

Because speed-accuracy trade off ...
amount to a generalisation of principles implicit in how fast processes handle familiar situations which allows us to apply those same principles in unfamiliar situations.
Reflective equilibrium might be interesting for all kinds of reasons (just as impetus mechanics is). But it is not a reliable method of discovering ethical truths.

1. Fast processes influence which intutions you have.

2. Fast processes are limited.

Therefore:

3. Where an ethical argument for a conclusion over which humans divide relies on intuitions as premises, we cannot use the argument to gain knowledge of its conclusion.